Allied Bombing Campaign in WWII - A Failure....

[Clinton Huxley]

Review of a new book by historian Richard Overy, which concludes that the bombing campaigns of the RAF and USAAF on Germany in WWII were a failure. Did bugger all to dent German morale, little impact on industrial output. Only real effect was the diversion of German resources from other areas to combat the bombers.

One for KLR to argue about

http://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/s ... ery-review

[JimC]

All the earlier stuff I have read suggested it had a significant effect, at least in part in diverting resources such as anti-aircraft batteries and fighters, which reduced German efforts on the eastern front...

There is always the ethical issue, especially the night bombing of cities, but that is separate...

[klr]

Review of a new book by historian Richard Overy, which concludes that the bombing campaigns of the RAF and USAAF on Germany in WWII were a failure. Did bugger all to dent German morale, little impact on industrial output. Only real effect was the diversion of German resources from other areas to combat the bombers.

One for KLR to argue about

http://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/s ... ery-review

Wait ... it's 2013, and he's only come to that conclusion now?

I have books from 30 years ago (from Max Hastings and Norman Longmate) that basically say the same things. Never mind the European version of the Strategic bombing survey, which was also quite limited in its praise*:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_survey

*Relative to the claims of the bomber commanders.

I'm not dissing Overy BTW - I have several of his books, and I'll likely be picking up this one once it gets to paperback.

[klr]

All the earlier stuff I have read suggested it had a significant effect, at least in part in diverting resources such as anti-aircraft batteries and fighters, which reduced German efforts on the eastern front...

This is certainly true. That and forcing the Luftwaffe into such levels of attrition that it was effectively finished as a fighting force by the middle of 1944. The D-Day invasion benefited hugely from that, as did the Soviets on the Eastern front.

There is always the ethical issue, especially the night bombing of cities, but that is separate...

It was strongly believed at the time that area bombing would cause a collapse in civilian morale, and therefore bring any war to a quick conclusion. That was the justification behind building up huge strategic bomber forces. None of the Axis powers - not even the Germans - had anywhere near the resources to do this.

[Clinton Huxley]

Its hardly a revelatory conclusion but apparently the book is relentlessly thorough about the shortcomings of the bombing campaign. I hadn't heard the quote from the deputy to Bomber Harris calling D-Day an "unnecessary boating expedition".

[Clinton Huxley]

I don't know what percentage of Britain's industrial output Bomber Command was absorbing but I wonder about the opportunity costs - could that capacity have been used for something else that would have had greater impact.

[klr]

Its hardly a revelatory conclusion but apparently the book is relentlessly thorough about the shortcomings of the bombing campaign. I hadn't heard the quote from the deputy to Bomber Harris calling D-Day an "unnecessary boating expedition".

I wasn't aware of that particular quote, but it doesn't surprise me at all. Harris hated anything that diverted resources from his area bombing campaign, and preparatory bombing for D-Day meant he had to scale area bombing right back for several months.

He also hated any type of targeting directive against installations within Germany that diverted him from flattening (or burning) cities. Oil plants, U-boat pens, ball bearing plants, etc. For a long time, it was left to the Americans to attack those types of targets in daylight, usually with very high losses.

Later on of course, he had no problems claiming the credit for Bomber command involvement in supporting D-Day and the Normandy campaign, sinking the Tirpitz, the Peenemünde raids, etc.

I don't know what percentage of Britain's industrial output Bomber Command was absorbing but I wonder about the opportunity costs - could that capacity have been used for something else that would have had greater impact.

It was certainly huge. Between them, the USA and the UK produced about 50,000 heavy bombers and related aircraft up to the end of WW II, at least 20 times more than what the Axis produced. It wasn't just the aircraft themselves, but the crews, the infrastructure, and everything else that went with it. But the opportunity costs go both ways, as the Germans had to devote enormous resources to defending themselves against the bombing. Much of this was ineffective - it took c. 14,000 anti-aircraft shells to bring down one bomber - but it was politically necessary as far as the Nazi leadership was concerned.

[klr]

On bombing accuracy: It's not often realized how bad this was for much of the war. It was not even a case of RAF night bombers being able to accurately drop bombs on an identified target, or even correctly identifying the target. Sometimes it was just bad navigation. 20% of bombs falling within 5 miles is one statistic that comes to mind from 1941 (IIRC). That lack of accuracy helped the area bombing agenda.

[Clinton Huxley]

I've seem it argued that the USAAF precision bombing wasn't much more accurate.

[klr]

I've seem it argued that the USAAF precision bombing wasn't much more accurate.

It was certainly a lot more accurate than RAF bombing, although when you have hundreds of aircraft attacking the same area, everything is relative.

The Americans didn't go in for incendiary bombing in Europe, so the casualties they inflicted there were an order of magnitude less than those caused by the RAF.

Oddly enough, it was the RAF that pioneered the best precision bombing techniques, and also the best ways of getting masses of aircraft to attack the same small area. But much of that did not come to fruition until the last few months of the war, when it was too late.

[Clinton Huxley]

"Area bombing of precision targets" v "Precision bombing of area targets".......

[klr]

"Area bombing of precision targets" v "Precision bombing of area targets".......

A bit like medium fast v. fast medium bowlers ... a bit hard to work out the difference sometimes.

I just checked on Amazon, and the book is (predictably) not yet available in hardback. The Kindle* version is nearly as expensive as the hardback.

*Does Amazon accommodate other e-readers?

[Clinton Huxley]

Ah, the old e-book price rip off. Just reading a review of Max Hastings book about Bomber Command. BC was consuming 1/3 of British industrial capacity. Hastings proposes a couple of better uses for this than carpet bombing Germany - persevering with precision bombing, using more resources for Battle of Atlantic, sending more aircraft to tjhe Middle/Far East. Hindsight, of course, but it kind of looks like too many eggs were placed in Bomber Command's basket.

[klr]

Ah, the old e-book price rip off. Just reading a review of Max Hastings book about Bomber Command. BC was consuming 1/3 of British industrial capacity. Hastings proposes a couple of better uses for this than carpet bombing Germany - persevering with precision bombing, using more resources for Battle of Atlantic, sending more aircraft to tjhe Middle/Far East. Hindsight, of course, but it kind of looks like too many eggs were placed in Bomber Command's basket.

This would certainly have made a difference, especially if it had been done during 1940-1942. Even in 1943, Harris was still grudgingly conceding small numbers of strategic bombers to Coastal Commend, for use as very long-range patrol aircraft. The Americans would eventually supply them with all the aircraft they needed.

You could also argue that resources spent on building and operating a bomber fleet should have been better spent on more and better convoy escorts.

Part of the reason why the bombing campaign persisted (and continued to grow) almost to the very end of the war is because it enjoyed Churchill's personal support. Until after Dresden that is, when he began to get serious cold feet. Without Churchill, Harris would probably have been relieved as head of Bomber Command at some point in 1943 or 1944.

[Clinton Huxley]

I'd have bunged Bletchley Park a few more quid. Was watching Science Britannicus last night. Story of Bill Tutte, who broke the Lorenz cipher with a piece of paper, a pencil and a stupendously clever brain.